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1. Phenomenology as a philosophy of immanence 
The critique of ontology defined twentieth-century philosophy in both the Anglo-American and 
the European traditions. In Europe, the most generative form of this critique was phenomenology, 
which sought to be true to what can appear and be known to humans from within their cognitive 
apparatus – in other words, to be true to humans’ structures of intentionality, their ways of relating 
themselves to others and to objects. In the hands of thinkers like Martin Heidegger, this 
phenomenological method meant a bracketing of metaphysics (which now appeared formulated 
from a spurious God’s-eye view), and with it, ultimately, a bracketing of any talk about God. 
Because God was, for Heidegger following Kierkegaard, of ‘infinite qualitative difference’ from 
humans, coming to humans (if at all) wholly from without, philosophers cannot responsibly speak 
of him.  
 
This begins as an epistemological argument; but like Kant, Heidegger underpins it with a logical 
one. What God might give humans – the gift of grace as a participation in divine plenitude – is 
not in fact thinkable. To think it results in an existential antinomy similar to Kant’s antinomies of 
reason: the very ‘eschatological unrest’ that defines human existence – its dynamics of desire – 
cannot in fact find ‘completion’ without ceasing to be what it most deeply is: life as movement and 
striving. This was already noted by Kant and even by Hegel.  
Death plays both an existential and a logical role here. It bounds our life existentially: at the 
very moment when we could say, ‘now I am fully myself; I no longer have actions and passions 
ahead of me that will shape and define who I am’, we no longer are. The moment of completion 
is also the moment of death, of no longer knowing ourselves at all. In this role, death, for 
Heidegger, also serves as a logical symbol of the impossibility of plenitude.  
For Heidegger, as we know, this results in a vision of humanity that is defined by an ethical 
imperative: the imperative neither to deny the pull of plenitude, nor to surrender to its illusion. He 
gives us, in other words, an ethical inflection of the (Kantian) problem of metaphysics, centring 
on a morally charged description of ‘the human’ as defined most vitally by the tension between 
ineluctable finitude and the equally persistent desire to transcend it. The aim of philosophy is here 
no longer to aspire to a transcendent ideal, but to sustain an ‘authentic’ human existence by 
refusing to collapse this constitutive tension into either a metaphysical meta-narrative or an 
apathetic denial of its allure.  
 
2. Diastatic and diathetic responses to this challenge 
In the course of the 20th century, two main theological strategies developed for responding to 
Heidegger’s challenge from within a phenomenological tradition; call them the diastatic and the 
diathetic. By ‘diastatic’ I mean arguments against the exclusion of God from phenomenological 
description which focus on the implications of desire as a basic mode of human intentionality. By 
‘diathetic’, I mean arguments which focus on the human openness to identity-shaping experiences 
that come from outwith their own structures of intentionality.  
First, the diastatic. Catholics such as Henri de Lubac (here following Maurice Blondel), Edith 
Stein, and Karl Rahner argued that rather than naturally bracketing any speculation about a 
supernatural origin or end to human existence, phenomenology in fact fails in its core task of 
describing human intentionality if it ignores the inalienable presence within human self-
consciousness of an orientation towards the supernatural. The Catholics parse this inalienable 
presence in different ways: Stein as the infinite towards which finite human consciousness ‘breaks 
open’1; Rahner as the horizon of all human acts of knowing2; but most influentially, de Lubac (after 
Blondel) as a ‘natural desire for the supernatural’. Although Blondel stressed that only God could 
reveal himself as the fulfilment of the God-shaped ‘blank spaces’ naturally felt,3 these existential 
‘needs’4 themselves were an inalienable part of human experience, and therefore could not be 
excluded from an existential phenomenology. De Lubac shifts Blondel’s terminology of ‘need’ to 
the more affirmative one of ‘desire’, and argues that the experience of desire is not a mere 
recognition of lack, but itself already an indication of an identity-defining divine call.  
Stein, Rahner, Blondel, and de Lubac all trace their responses back to Thomas Aquinas. In 
other words, the challenge posed by phenomenology spurs them to re-read Thomas (as well as 
Augustine, Bonaventure and others5) in a phenomenological light, seeking in the ancients’ 
discussions of anamnesis, divine illumination, etc. veins of experience that would not be ruptured 
by the phenomenologists’ razor.  
Secondly, the diathetic. Instead of trying to accommodate an openness to the transcendent 
in human structures of intentionality (such as desire), later French philosophers including Jean-
Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean-Yves Lacoste reject the frame of ‘intentionality’ 
altogether, arguing instead that the most important phenomena, even of everyday experience, are 
those that claim or overwhelm us from outside our own intentional movements. It is precisely 
those irrupting phenomena – for Levinas the face, for Marion and others the saturated 
phenomenon – by whose affect we are constituted. For the theologian, this means that we are not 
in fact making a phenomenologically exceptional case for God when we claim that he irrupts into 
human experience from outside human categories or intentionality: many kinds of phenomena do 
so. As with the diastatic approach, talk of God is saved from the phenomenological critique by a 
re-staking of phenomenology’s bounds from within.  
Theologically, these two strategies can crudely be said to map onto familiar divides between 
theologies of glory and theologies of the cross: the first assumes a connatural stretching towards 
God, the second the irruption of a radically other God from beyond our structures of knowing.  
Ontologically, the first conceives God (analogically) as Being; the second conceives Being 
univocally, and God as beyond it. 
 
3. Desire and participation 
It is, unsurprisingly, the first, diastatic strategy of overcoming the phenomenological challenge 
from within which has most shaped the work of ressourcement and Radical Orthodoxy. This is 
because that language of desire dovetails with a renewed, Catholic characterisation of God not 
primarily through appeal to infinite qualitative difference, but through appeal to his indwelling in 
our innermost depths. In other words, these responses are metaphysically underpinned by the 
assertion of a participation (whether neo-Platonic or analogical in emphasis) in the Trinitarian 
ground of being. This participation in plenitude also, as John Milbank has often written, calls for 
a different logic: a logic of gift and excess.  
We see this in many places throughout the corpus. Catherine Pickstock wrote (now twenty 
years ago) that the Christian desire for the good ‘does not lack its object in the ordinary sense of 
lack, but attains its goal in and through the act of desiring.’6 And John Milbank puts it, describing 
Henri de Lubac’s position, which he shares, as follows: ‘Spiritual beings in their deepest identity 
are lured to unity with God – even in some sense already possess this unity.’7  
Catherine sees this participation as proleptically realized in the liturgy. Through 
acknowledgement of our brokenness and limitation, she thinks, we can yet break through, in this 
hallowed space, to participation in the heavenly realm, in which time is turned to peace: ‘The 
request for peace can only be made authentically from within peace, from within the heavenly 
realm which we now do not merely impersonate’.8 
My critical point is directed both at this participatory response and at the diathetic response 
of Marion’s theological recipients, but it is the former I’m more invested in, and so address 
primarily. I feel the need to say that the work of re-constructing an ontology of finite reality by 
participation in the Trinity – whether experientially mediated by desire or the reception of saturated 
phenomena – is vital, but also dangerous.  
The danger is hinted at, for example, by the fact that accounts of participation 
characteristically refer back to a time that never was, an idealized medieval era in which the 
participatory ontology the writers sketch was real. That’s because such an ontology needs to be 
instantiated to count for anything, and yet it’s manifestly not instantiated now. There are, of course, 
always witnesses to experiences of participation – but these are deeply fraught. They are vulnerable 
to disconfirmation (‘what I thought was plenitude was really manipulation’), to over-narrating, and 
re-narrating (ask anyone whose family has fallen apart). Narratives of plenitude are also hard to 
shield from the construction of political utopias, or the over-valorization of perceived 
instantiations of Trinitarian participation. More seriously, ultimately, participatory ontology finds 
it very hard to avoid some form of pantheism.  
 
5. Desire and eschatology 
Heidegger has to be taken more seriously here. Human temporality and mortality cannot simply 
be outpaced towards participation in plenitude, whether in knowledge or being. Participatory 
ontology is too often over-realized eschatology. 
The phenomenological critique, therefore, demands an eschatological dimension to 
Trinitarian ontology: a theology of participation that takes more seriously the eschatological 
preliminariness of human knowing and being. Attending to a phenomenology of desire is essential 
to this. Because Heidegger is right: the desire we might feel for God is precisely the desire for 
something that could not be given in our spatio-temporal existence: it is an existential aporia. 
The object of our desire for plenitude, in other words, is impossible to determine from 
within. This is partly because desire is always mediated by imagination, while the fulfilment of 
desire is strictly beyond our imagination. We can never fully escape the Feuerbachian and 
Derridean critique that desire and imagination may simply project its own image. Of course we 
have knowledge of God in Christ – God is not an entire eschatological unknown – but what we 
see in Christ is not, for the most part, God in glory. As George MacDonald says, ‘“The door into 
life generally opens behind us,” and “the only wisdom” for one “haunted with the scent of unseen 
roses, is work”’, i.e. the imitation of Christ. 
This doesn’t mean that we should give up on desire. Thomas Aquinas, in a remarkable 
passage in the Summa Theologiae, even suggests that such desire might increase a capacity for 
beatitude: 
[T]he intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and 
he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more love; because where 
there is the greater love, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the 
one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the 
more love, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.9 
But it is vital to remember that desire is, as I’ve just said, for something that could not be given in 
our spatio-temporal existence. This is, I suggest, because our very mode of knowing now is merely 
an image, a preliminary, to the mode of knowing in which alone we could experience plenitude.  
We know all things now partly by self-reflection – by taking into ourselves, as the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition puts it, the thing known in the mode of the knower. But the New 
Testament suggests again and again that this is ‘return to self’ that will be broken. ‘Now I see in a 
glass darkly; but then I shall see face to face’.10 ‘Beloved, now are we the children of God, and it 
doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like 
him; for we shall see him as he is’.11 
To be created in the image of God, in Christ, means that we cannot know or be ourselves 
until we see him face to face. Contrary to the assumption of a basic and immediate epistemological 
access to the self which is prerequisite to all other knowledge, or the ability to take into ourselves 
all things known, St Paul here projects knowledge (or vision) of God as the most direct form of 
self-knowledge. In the eschaton, St Paul suggests, humans will know themselves not by reflecting 
on themselves but by beholding God and being beheld by him. This cannot mean a taking of God 
into ourselves, for he is infinite; it must mean a being taken of ourselves, somehow, into God – 
an entirely eccentric mode of knowledge of which our entire mode of knowing, here and now, 
where God is still hidden, is merely an image.  
But this means that we can live our being-towards-death as a being towards self-surrender, 
a surrender that’s not merely incidental to our entry into plenitude, but part of it. This is an 
epistemological inflection of Mark 8.35: ‘For whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, but 
whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel’s will save it.’ Being-towards-death, for the 
Christian, simply is being-towards-God. 
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